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Recent Canadian litigation on the collective rights of aboriginal nations has 
been examined mainly from the vantage point of Canada’s colonial/postcolonial 
politics. Who is winning and who is losing; how the scope of aboriginal rights is 
broadening, and with what effects; whether private corporations and provinces 
(rather than only the federal government) have a “duty to consult” and 
accommodate aboriginal interests; whether political negotiations, including but not 
limited to those resulting in “modern” treaties, are superseding litigation: these are 
the questions that, for good historical reasons, preoccupy most of the numerous 
commentators and stakeholders.  
It is also possible, however, to look at these cases—and the related political 
controversies—from other perspectives, using the rich materials generated by this 
litigation and the surrounding discussions to address questions that are neither 
strictly legal nor strictly political. Sociolegal studies can illuminate legal issues not 
only by providing empirical evidence of how law has come to be what it is or how 
law works in practice, but also by opening up legal black boxes. 
Thus, in keeping with methods and approaches developed in earlier work on 
the workings of legal knowledges in other areas of law,1 in this Article I show that 
 
*  Professor of Criminology, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto. 
This Article was first presented at the “‘Law As . . .’: Theory and Method in Legal History” 
conference at UC Irvine. My thanks to the participants for their comments, especially Kunal Parker 
and Chris Tomlins. Thanks also to Amar Bhatia, Renisa Mawani, Maureen Simpkins, and Wes Pue. 
1. See MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003); Ron Levi 
& Mariana Valverde, Studying Law by Association: Bruno Latour Goes to the Conseil d’État, 33 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 3, 805–25 (2008).  
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
956 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
this litigation has become not only an arena for renegotiating the status of the 
knowledges that aboriginal nations have of themselves but also, and less visibly, a 
venue in which the very essence of sovereignty in Canada is being quietly 
redefined. In other words: the key question regarding legal knowledges in this area 
of law used to be the admissibility and weight of aboriginal knowledges presented 
in non-European formats; but in recent years, a line of key cases (on “the duty to 
consult”) revealed that courts have decided to resort to medieval knowledges of 
“the Crown” to lay the basis for a jurisprudence in which the Crown’s inherent 
goodness—rather than any rights claims—becomes the source of aboriginal legal 
gains. In doing so courts are engaged, whether knowingly or not, in an exercise 
that I call “refurbishing the Crown for a multicultural age.” 
The literature on postcoloniality, most famously Edward Said’s Orientalism,2 
has shown that as European authorities came to “know,” classify, govern, and 
manage colonial Others, they simultaneously redescribed and revisioned 
themselves. It is no longer controversial to state that Europe became what it is 
now in large part because it defined itself as against a variety of colonial and/or 
savage Others. Scholarship on Canadian law and politics has thus far remained 
relatively untouched by this postcolonial turn, however. Aboriginal issues are 
certainly more central, and treated more seriously, than they were a decade or two 
ago. But by and large Canadians are engaged in discussions about remedial justice 
or about special provisions for aboriginal offenders or for aboriginal spaces. Few 
are asking the more fundamental question of whether acknowledging Canada’s 
colonial rule over aboriginal peoples necessitates putting in question our (white 
Canadian) knowledge of ourselves, our institutions, and our rules. This Article is 
in part a response to John Borrows’s challenge to take a serious postcolonial look 
at Canadian legal traditions, with a view to properly “provincializing”3 them, to 
use Dipesh Chakrabarty’s influential wording. 
This radical rethinking of Canadian politics, law, and culture can be furthered 
by considering that the most important cases affecting the collective rights of 
aboriginal peoples (especially the nontreaty nations of Western Canada), which are 
those developing the new doctrine of the “duty to consult,”4 do not turn on either 
 
2. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979). 
3. See JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION (2010). The author uses the 
Canadian legal pluralism tradition to suggest how aboriginal legal traditions can be integrated into the 
overall system, rather than being treated merely as a kind of personal law for aboriginal peoples. 
However, it stops short of questioning the colonial foundations of taken-for-granted legal tools (such 
as the law of evidence). On the nonaboriginal side, eminent left-liberal political theorist James Tully 
has also contributed to thinking about Canada postcolonially in his work STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995), although, like Borrows, he tends to assume, 
a priori, that “reconciliation” rather than struggle is an appropriate paradigm. On provincialization, see 
DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE 3–6 (2000). 
4. My thanks to Dwight Newman for clarifying the “duty to consult.” See LEONARD 
ROTMAN, PARALLEL PATHS: FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE AND THE CROWN-NATIVE RELATIONSHIP IN 
CANADA (1996); Brian Slattery, Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown, 20 SUP. CT. L. REV. 433, 
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the substance or the format of the evidence about aboriginal peoples presented by 
aboriginal nations, unlike earlier cases—Delgamuukw5 in particular. Instead, these 
cases present, without any fanfare or any footnotes, certain truths about the 
powerful if elusive entity that is “the Crown”—semimystical phrases that do the 
work that might otherwise have been done through rights claims.  
The courts’ recourse to the premodern notions of the Crown as inherently 
honourable is particularly paradoxical in the context of aboriginal litigation. 
Aboriginal oral narratives had long been dismissed by Euro-Canadians, judges 
included, as myths or legends. This changed over the course of the 1990s, 
especially through the Delgamuukw decision, as the rules governing evidence in 
aboriginal formats loosened up. By contrast, the story that the “duty to consult” 
jurisprudence tells about “the Crown” is not a story made up of any facts, or even 
of law, in the black-letter sense: it is rather a wholly magical invocation of the 
Crown’s inherent virtues. Noted legal scholar and aboriginal leader John Borrows 
remarked, concerning Delgamuukw, that despite the cheers of victory with which 
aboriginal leaders greeted the decision, the key political-legal effect of the decision 
is to perform an “alchemy” that consists of “conjuring sovereignty.”6 This is 
certainly accurate. But the more recent cases on the “duty to consult” feature 
white judges playing a shaman-like role with even greater vigour, since any justice 
effects resulting from those decisions have not arisen from any rights claims at all, 
and hence require no knowledge of aboriginality, self-generated or 
anthropological. The “duty to consult” cases produce “grace” more than justice. 
The efficacy of these cases, which has been regarded quite positively by many 
aboriginal commentators, is said by courts to be “grounded” in the doctrine that 
the Crown is always already honourable, with this honour then seeping into the 
crown’s “mystical body”—the Canadian state, in this instance—just as Christ’s 
virtues are deemed to seep into the mystical corporation that is the Christian 
church.7  
We will now turn to a brief consideration of the change in the rules 
concerning evidence of collective rights in aboriginal formats, then turn to the 
“duty to consult” cases, and, finally, consider why it may be that aboriginal legal 
scholars have been less critical of the paternalist, premodern, crypto-Christian 
logic of “the honour of the Crown” doctrine than one might have thought. 
I. KNOWLEDGE FORMATS AND THE PERFORMATIVITY OF NARRATIVES 
The key cases that changed the rules regarding the admissibility and weight 
 
445 (2005). 
5. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.). 
6. John Borrows, Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 558 (1999). 
7. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957).  
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of aboriginal knowledge formats are the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in 
Delgamuukw and in Van der Peet,8 and two more recent lower court decisions arising 
from the Tsilhqot’in nation’s aboriginal title claim (William v BC 9 and Tsilhqot’in v 
BC10). 
Let us begin with the most important of these cases, namely, Delgamuukw, 
which noted political scientist Peter Russell sees as the most important and 
innovative decision on aboriginal common law title in the world.11 I will here use 
John Borrows’s summary of the link between the claims about aboriginal title and 
the character of the aboriginal people’s knowledges: 
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada 
considered the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en people’s claim to aboriginal 
title and self-government over approximately 58,000 square kilometres of 
land in (what is now called) northwest British Columbia. Both nations 
have lived in this area as “distinct people” for a “long long time prior to 
[British assertions of] sovereignty.” For millenia, their histories have 
recorded their organization into Houses and Clans in which hereditary 
chiefs have been responsible for the allocation, administration, and 
control of traditional lands. Within these Houses, chiefs pass on 
important histories, songs, crests, lands, ranks, and properties from one 
generation to the next. The passage of these legal, political, social and 
economic entitlements is performed and witnessed through Feasts. These 
Feasts substantiate the territories’ relationships.12  
The trial judge decided that many (though not all) of the ritual narratives of 
the House chiefs of both nations were admissible. But he then proceeded to 
deprive them of weight because they did not purport to set out “hard facts” but 
were rather a mix of “myth” and reality.13 And he also refused to admit oral 
 
8. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (Can.). 
9. William v. British Columbia, (2004) 24 B.C.L.R. 4th 296 (Can. B.C. S.C.), [2004] 2 C.N.L.R. 
380. 
10. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 (Can. B.C.), [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 
112 (Can.). 
11. PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE 343 (2005). The classic work on 
aboriginal title in the British Empire and Commonwealth is KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW 
ABORIGINAL TITLE (1989). This work valiantly tried to scour the common law of real property, and 
particularly the feudal doctrine of tenures, in order to discern possession rights for aboriginal peoples 
that did not have to depend on either treaties or the recognition of customary law. McNeil’s work has 
been quite influential within the courts, but this book is now superseded since recent cases (including 
to some extent the Australian Mabo decision) give some recognition to customary law, and hence 
recognize aboriginal title under the doctrine of continuity, thus making the legal fictions of Crown 
paramount lordship and aboriginal tenant rights unnecessary. 
12. Borrows, supra note 6, at 538–39 (emphasis added). 
13. The Delgamuukw case was complicated by the fact that the pleadings were substantially 
changed between the trial and the appeal. The original claims were for “ownership” of the lands in 
question and “jurisdiction.” These far-reaching radical claims were abandoned in favor of the more 
achievable pursuit of “title.” Title, of course, is a legal burden on the land, but is not full property. 
And even full property would not establish jurisdiction. 
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evidence in the form of “territorial affidavits.”14 In addition, a crucial fact that 
many commentaries on the decision neglect to discuss is that even those narratives 
that were said to be admissible were allowed in as exceptions to the hearsay rule—
a classification that has the effect of making aboriginal representations of 
aboriginal history structurally inferior to the expert affidavits presented by 
historians and anthropologists.15  
Mindful of the loud accusations of racism that had greeted the trial judge’s 
ethnocentric dismissal of the aboriginal narratives,16 the Supreme Court’s 
judgement employed the discursive and textual conventions that are commonly 
used to perform Canadian multiculturalism to explain to the Canadian public the 
Gitksan term adaawk (a particular narrative performed at feasts by chiefs, with 
performative effects) and the Wet’suwet’en term kungax (a song with similar ritual 
and performative qualities).  
Having acknowledged these (and then other) nontraditionally formatted 
evidence, in prose that, significantly, refuses to translate adaawk and kungax into 
English or French equivalents, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer chastised the trial 
judge as follows: “The implication of the trial judge’s reasoning is that oral 
histories should never be given any independent weight and are only useful as 
confirmatory evidence in aboriginal rights litigation. I fear that if this reasoning 
were followed, the oral histories of aboriginal peoples would be consistently and 
systematically undervalued by the Canadian legal system.”17  
Lamer allowed the trial judge to save face, however, by pointing out that he 
did not have the benefit of his (Lamer’s) previous decision in Van der Peet, a 
British Columbia aboriginal fishing rights case which had laid down more 
generous rules regarding aboriginal knowledge formats.18 
In determining whether an aboriginal claimant has produced evidence 
sufficient to demonstrate that her activity is an aspect of a practice, 
custom or tradition integral to a distinctive aboriginal culture, a court 
should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence that 
exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims, and 
of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times 
where there were no written records of the practices, customs and 
 
14. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, paras. 102–04 (Can.). 
15. An excellent analysis of some of the myriad problems caused by having aboriginal elders 
testify about their history and their law in courts using European structures and procedures is 
provided in Val Napoleon, Delgamuukw: A Legal Straitjacket for Oral Histories, 20 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 123, 
123–55 (2005). 
16. See, e.g., DARA CULHANE, THE PLEASURE OF THE CROWN: ANTHROPOLOGY, LAW, AND 
FIRST NATIONS (1998). A detailed account of the way in which evidence was gathered and presented 
by the First Nations at trial is found in RICHARD DALY, OUR BOX WAS FULL: AN ETHNOGRAPHY 
FOR THE DELGAMUUKW PLAINTIFFS (2005). Daly was one of the numerous anthropologists who 
testified as expert witnesses at trial supporting the aboriginal claim for title. 
17. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 98. 
18. See id. at paras. 99–105. 
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traditions engaged in. The courts must not undervalue the evidence 
presented by aboriginal claimants simply because that evidence does not 
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied 
in, for example, a private law torts case.19  
This passage (the only one concerning the format of evidence in a very long 
judgement) is remarkably vague. It tells judges that they must be nice to aboriginal 
elders who are providing evidence in unusual formats, but it signally fails to 
specify how exactly evidence that is legally classified as hearsay, no matter how 
beautifully performed by elders in traditional dress, or how respectfully heard by 
judges, is supposed to serve to counter the weight of legal arguments made by 
government lawyers—as well as the long-established weight of European written 
records, such as the journals of Hudson’s Bay Company officials.20 To give one 
example: the Delgamuukw decision spent quite some time considering the issue of 
the temporality of the Crown’s sovereignty, and finally decided on 1846, the date 
of the Oregon treaty establishing the forty-ninth parallel as the boundary between 
the United States and British Columbia, then still a British colony.21 Other 
possible dates were the late eighteenth-century “discovery” journeys of Captain 
John Vancouver, and 1871, the year when British Columbia joined the Dominion 
of Canada, established in 1867. Aboriginal peoples’ histories and periodizations 
were not deemed relevant to the establishment of the legally important date of 
(colonial) sovereignty.22 
The Delgamuukw decision built on Van der Peet’s vague multiculturalist 
exhortation by providing some slightly, but only slightly, firmer wording on the 
question of aboriginal performative narratives and songs. Justice Lamer said that 
“the ordinary rules of evidence must be approached and adapted in the light of the 
evidentiary difficulties inherent in adjudicating aboriginal claims,”23 and chastised 
 
19. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 68 (Can.). 
20. Luis Campos, an SJD student at the University of Toronto, is writing a dissertation that 
critically analyzes the formats and the built-in assumptions of the Hudson’s Bay Company records 
that have played such a key role in aboriginal title litigation in Western Canada. 
21. See Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 145. 
22. Kantorowicz, would remark that inquiring into the “when” of the Crown’s sovereignty 
deconstructs the key “sempiternal” ontological fiction of “the Crown”—which, unlike, say, the 
French or the American Republic, is not said to have a clear empirical beginning. See KANTOROWICZ, 
supra note 7. But be that as it may, establishing an agreed upon date of “sovereignty,” that is colonial 
sovereignty, is important for land claims cases because the common law of aboriginal title has long 
held that hunting and fishing and other rights that flow from aboriginal title are only protected in the 
present (in the absence of treaties) if one can trace them back to the date at which sovereignty was 
effectively claimed. See MCNEIL, supra note 11. The ethnocentric assumption that aboriginal practices 
are protected only to the extent to which they are “frozen” have recently come under judicial self-
criticism. See, e.g., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 240 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., dissenting). 
At present, the rights being claimed have to still be traceable to precontact times, but it is admitted, 
for example, that using a snowmobile to trap fur-bearing animals is a valid continuation of precontact 
traditional practices. See, e.g., JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF 
INDIGENOUS LAW (2002) for a very moderate critique of this form of judicial reasoning. 
23. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 105. 
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the trial judge for dismissing “territorial affidavits” on the grounds that they had 
been actively discussed in communities for many years, rather than lying statically 
in archives: “The net effect [of applying the standards used for historical 
documents to oral narratives ritually performed by chiefs] may be that a society 
with such an oral tradition would never be able to establish a historical claim 
through the use of oral history in court.”24 
Just how the Chief Justice would have weighed evidence in the form of 
adaawk and kungax is a question that was never answered, however. In the end, 
the Court ordered a new trial—but also urged the parties to negotiate politically 
rather than relitigate (which is what indeed happened).25 Subsequent court rulings, 
however, do not consistently follow Lamer’s exhortation to not treat oral evidence 
as if it were composed of documents.  
In the 2001 decision in the Mitchell 26 case, launched by the Mohawks at 
Akwesasne, newly appointed Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin repeated Lamer’s 
multiculturalist incantation (“judges must resist facile assumptions based on 
Eurocentric traditions of gathering and passing on historical facts”). But she 
followed this by a qualification that amounted to a negation, warning ominously 
that “there is a boundary that must not be crossed between a sensitive application 
and a complete abandonment of the rules of evidence.” The phrase “the rules of 
evidence” is quite telling: Chief Justice McLachlin admits that evidence previously 
considered “mythical” can now be given weight, but she cannot imagine that the 
rules of evidence could themselves be critiqued for their colonial assumptions. She 
thus concludes that evidence of aboriginal title does not have to look like evidence 
in a private torts case;27 but “neither should it be artificially strained to carry more 
weight than it can reasonably support.”28 And in sharp contrast to the 1997 
 
24. There were concurring judgments by other justices but none took issue with Justice 
Lamer’s discussion of aboriginal oral narratives. Id. para. 106. 
25. While the Delgamuukw case was winding its way to the Supreme Court, the political 
situation in British Columbia changed significantly. To make a very long story short, in 1998 the first 
treaty of the contemporary era was signed—the Nisga’a treaty. For the current state of treaty 
negotiations, see THE FIRST NATIONS SUMMIT, http://www.fns.bc.ca (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). See 
also ANDREW WOOLFORD, BETWEEN JUSTICE AND CERTAINTY: TREATY MAKING IN BRITISH 
COLUMBIA (2005); NATIONAL CENTRE FOR FIRST NATIONS GOVERNANCE, http:// 
www.fngovernance.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2011); MINISTRY OF ABORIGINAL RELATIONS AND 
RECONCILIATION, http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). See also COUNCIL OF THE 
HAIDA NATION, http://www.haidanation.ca (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).  
26. Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (Can.). 
27. See LEONARD IAN ROTMAN, PARALLEL PATHS: FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE AND THE 
CROWN–NATIVE RELATIONSHIP IN CANADA (1996). One might well ask why a private tort came to 
the judge’s mind here, rather than some area of public law; the reason for this lies in the continuing 
strength of the paternalist idea that the federal government has a fiduciary responsibility to protect 
hapless Indians from being exploited by white settlers and resource-exploiting provincial 
governments. 
28. Mitchell, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, para. 39; see Stephanie Lysyk, Evidentiary Issues: Oral Tradition 
Evidence, THE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, http:// 
www.cle.bc.ca/PracticePoints/ABOR/Evidentiary.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
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critique of the trial judge’s ethnocentrism, in this case McLachlin criticized the trial 
judge for “an unreasonably generous weighing of dubious evidence.”29 
Further undermining the promise of Delgamuukw, in one notable case, the use 
of wampum belts30 as legal objects providing evidence of the economic and 
political activities of the Mi’kmaq people (in what is now Nova Scotia) backfired 
rather badly. Chief Stephen Augustine and his people believed that a wampum 
belt that was an important legal document was made in the seventeenth century, 
and took the trouble to make an exact replica to bring to court—the original being 
unavailable, having been stored in the Vatican archives. However, an 
anthropologist hired by the government went to the Vatican and had the original 
belt scrutinized by Western experts. He then testified that the belt was made in the 
nineteenth century, not the seventeenth, and that it had been given by aboriginals 
in Quebec, not Nova Scotia, to the Pope. This was taken as undermining not only 
the evidentiary value of the belt but also the credibility of Chief Augustine: the 
court concluded that in regard to the belt, while the chief was “thoroughly 
truthful,” his evidence was “in error.”31  
Even if the wampum belt’s authenticity had been verified by experts, 
however, it is doubtful the judge would have been very favourably impressed by 
the Mi’kmaq legal argument. The judge’s comments are worth citing at some 
length, since they clearly show the epistemological double bind faced by aboriginal 
witnesses testifying about aboriginal history and law. On the one hand, the judge 
takes it for granted that written records of colonial explorers and officials are more 
authoritative because they are written.32 But on the other hand, the oral evidence 
of this Mi’kmaq chief is said to be unreliable because he is an insufficiently 
authentic specimen or exhibit of tradition given that he and his forebears are 
literate in English: 
Chief Augustine knows a great deal about Mi’kmaq culture and history. 
He is a man of great dignity. . . . [But] the written record proves 
otherwise. . . . In the present case we have evidence of oral traditions 
provided by a single witness. We don’t know whether the traditions he 
relates were influenced by his own literacy or that of his forebears. We 
don’t know whether there are other Mi’kmaq tradition bearers or other 
traditions about the same topics. On the other hand, we do have a mass 
 
29. Mitchell, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, para. 51. 
30. In Eastern Canada wampum belts were made to mark or perform treaties, both amongst 
aboriginal nations (e.g. the Haudeshone and the Anishnabek, in 1701) and between aboriginal nations 
and “the Crown.” The two-row wampum belt, in particular, has been interpreted as a symbol or 
harbinger of a future postcolonial Canada by the eminent political theorist James Tully. TULLY, supra 
note 3, at 127–30. 
31. R. v. Marshall, (2001) 191 N.S.R. 2d 323, para. 63 (Can. N.S. Provincial Ct.). John 
Borrows makes the point that it might have been better for Canadian law as well as for aboriginal 
interests if Chief Augustine had been treated as providing evidence about Mi’kmaq law, rather than as 
a quasi-historian. BORROWS, supra note 2, at 69. 
32. See JACK GOODY, THE POWER OF THE WRITTEN TRADITION (2000). 
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of 18th century documents, both French and British, containing no 
evidence of seven districts and a Grand Council. The massive written 
record is far more convincing than the minimal oral evidence.33  
II. AUTHENTIC ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND AUTHORITATIVE JUDICIAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
The epistemological double bind in which the court placed Chief Augustine 
is not unique to aboriginal peoples. “Ethnic” Canadians too are sometimes 
regarded as less than authoritative sources of knowledge about minority cultures if 
they are well integrated into “mainstream” Canadian society, even though ethnic 
Canadians who speak excellent English and have been here many years could 
arguably be regarded as better placed to explain the kinds of things that white 
Canadians need to know. If Chief Augustine was regarded as lacking in 
authenticity, truly “authentic” spokespeople for a minority group suffer from a 
different problem, namely, too much authenticity, which generates a need for 
translation and cultural brokering. 
To examine some of the dynamics of cultural brokering in legal contexts, it 
will be useful to turn to the Tsilhqot’in witnesses in a recent British Columbia land 
claims case, analyzing the unusual textual practices deployed by British Columbia 
trial court judge Vickers, who heard over three hundred days of testimony 
concerning the land claims of Tsilhqot’in Nation.  
A significant portion of the trial took place in the schoolhouse of a remote 
northern community that relied on a generator for electricity, a community in 
which, unlike in many other aboriginal communities in Canada, many of the 
witnesses required translators to testify. Obviously moved by what he had seen 
and heard, the judge chose to begin his formal judgement with a long preface 
acknowledging the essential work performed by “word spellers” and interpreters.34 
After this unusual preface (which appears as part of the text of the 
judgement), the judge, instead of recounting the facts of the case, chose to make a 
proclamation through which the changing legal status of aboriginal claims and 
aboriginal knowledge formats are directly linked to Canada’s official policy of 
multiculturalism. The decision begins as follows: “Canada’s multicultural society 
did not begin when various European nations colonized North America. Rather, 
multiculturalism on this continent had its genesis thousands of years ago . . . . 
Today’s modern, multi-cultural communities seldom, if ever, look back at the 
Aboriginal roots of Canadian diversity.”35 
 
33. Marshall, (2001) 191 N.S.R. 2d 323, paras 63, 65. 
34. Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, [2008] 1 C.N.L.R 112. There is a 
separate decision by the same judge establishing rules for the leading of evidence in aboriginal 
knowledge formats. William v. British Columbia, (2004) 24 B.C.L.R. 4th 296 (Can. B.C. S.C.), [2004] 2 
C.N.L.R. 380 (Roger William is the English name of the Tsilhqot’in hereditary chief.). 
35. Tsilhqot’in Nation, 2007 BCSC 1700, para. 1. 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
964 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
The diversity of aboriginal languages, customary laws, and cultures is thus 
read by Judge Vickers as multiculturalism avant la lettre—a reading which aboriginal 
people may find demeaningly Eurocentric, but which is not unique. Richard Day’s 
careful archeology of multicultural federal policy cites a 1987 Secretary of State 
document proclaiming that “cultural diversity characterized the earliest societies to 
be seen through the mists of our history. Aboriginal peoples speaking a diversity 
of Algonkian tongues were spread across the breadth of North America.”36 
The implicit and/or thoughtless slippage from multicultural policy to 
aboriginal policy affects not only the content of judicial and other state 
pronouncements but also the formats used in official documents. This can be seen 
in the Tsilhqot’in decision just cited. Following the usual Canadian knowledge 
practices in regard to multiculturalism, which treat each “ethnic” group as clearly 
and statically bounded and as internally homogeneous, Judge Vickers takes a great 
deal of time to explain to less informed readers of the judgement how the 
Tsilhqot’in people (not aboriginals in general) think about temporalization:  
It may be helpful to explain some common Tsilhqot’in words and 
concepts that are used in the evidence I am about to describe. Tsilhqot’in 
people traditionally used a lunar calendar . . . . The Tsilhqot’in calendar 
also identifies the seasons: xi (winter), ?eghulhts’en (spring), dan 
(summer) and dan ch’iz (fall). Tsilhqot’in history is not known in terms of 
calendar years. The depth of Tsilhqot’in oral history and oral traditions is 
measured in terms of generations and historical events. 
  Tsilhqot’in people identify sadanx as a legendary period of time which 
took place long ago. This was a time when legends began and when the 
ancestors, land and animals were transforming according to supernatural 
powers. 
  Yedanx denilin is a long time ago and includes the period of time 
prior to contact and the time period that is pre- and post-sovereignty. 
Witnesses described their grandparents and great grandparents as living in 
yedanx. Theophile Ubill Lulua testified that the Tsilhqot’in [Chilcotin] 
War occurred in the yedanx period. 
  ?Undidanx is a period of time that one might characterize as recent 
history. 
 As I understood the evidence, Tsilhqot’in people, whether living in 
sadanx or yedanx, are all ?Esggidam (ancestors). A person living in 
?unidanx . . . is not an ?Esggidam. Witnesses described the seasonal 
rounds and the activities undertaken on those rounds as activities carried 
 
36. See  RICHARD J.F. DAY, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN 
DIVERSITY 6 (2000). That many aboriginal nations within Canada are not Algonkian, incidentally, 
would be a well-known fact in the Indian Affairs department, but apparently unknown to the 
multiculturalism bureaucrats. On multicultural policy, see also EVA MACKEY, THE HOUSE OF 
DIFFERENCE (1999). 
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out by the ?Esggidam in yedanx and as far back as sadanx.37  
Vickers’s text refuses to estrange Tsilhqot’in words by underlining or 
italicizing, as is usually done with foreign words inserted in English texts. The 
absence of typographical markers of otherness—probably an unintended effect of 
the software used to post legal decisions online—brings Vickers’s text very close 
to the textual practices of anthropologists, who carefully respect, and explain, their 
informants’ classification systems. Vickers’s move away from law and into 
anthropology38 is compounded by the fact that his text uses “foreign” concepts 
cumulatively, rather than simply being quickly mentioned one at a time as is 
normal judicial practice39—as well as by the unusual sight of question marks 
placed at the beginning of words. Vickers clearly made a major effort to 
understand, and to convey to nonaboriginal Canadians, many important features 
of Tsilhqot’in life and thought, in a welcome change from the demeaning judicial 
attitudes of the past—but whether constructing the Tsilhqot’in people as yet 
another multicultural group makes sense either empirically or normatively is a 
more fundamental question, and one that Vickers’s own judgement forecloses. 
Leaving the multicultural-aboriginal slippages aside for a moment, let us now 
turn to the “duty to consult” jurisprudence, since only after understanding this 
very new but very old doctrine will we able to ask some concluding questions 
about the way in which courts are redefining sovereignty for a multicultural—but 
not postcolonial or postmonarchical—Canada. 
III. REFURBISHING THE CROWN 
A recent line of cases concerning aboriginal peoples has established a 
government “duty to consult” (in regard to natural resource development, mainly) 
that may have more significant and beneficial practical implications for aboriginal 
peoples than the epistemologically and legally laborious establishment of 
aboriginal title and other aboriginal rights, especially for those aboriginal nations 
whose traditional territories hold mineral or other resources valuable to 
corporations. 
The judges who have discovered or created this “duty to consult” 
consistently state that the “foundation” of this duty lies in “the honour of the 
Crown.” The Supreme Court decision in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
 
37. Tsilhqot’in Nation, 2007 BCSC 1700, paras. 350–55. 
38. In the end, despite the great respect shown by Vickers to aboriginal witnesses and their 
narratives, he did not find that title had been proven. The quality of his anthropological inquiry, 
therefore, does not correlate with practical legal benefits. See id. 
39. Apart from the black-letter question of the role of appellate versus trial courts, it is 
important to also note, from an empirical sociolegal perspective, that the syntax and the semantics of 
Supreme Court judgments on aboriginal issues are shaped by the fact that those judges do not travel 
to remote aboriginal communities, do not see the litigants (except perhaps as silent, distant figures on 
the seating provided at the Supreme Court), and do not have to wait for evidence to be translated into 
French or English. 
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Forests)40 puts the matter in a phrase that is oddly at odds with the principles of 
democracy and the supremacy of parliament that Canadians believe are the 
“grounds” of Canadian law: “The government’s duty to consult with Aboriginal 
peoples and accommodate their interests is grounded in the honour of the 
Crown.”41  
The view that it is the “honour of the Crown,” not the acknowledgement of 
past injustice or the requirements of modern rights doctrines, that is responsible 
for greatly expanding the opportunities for aboriginal peoples not only to earn 
royalties but also to take a role in establishing rules for the management of natural 
resources and wilderness areas42 is consistently presented without chapter or verse, 
as if it were self-evident. A typical text, from Van der Peet, reads as follows: 
The Crown has a fiduciary obligation to aboriginal peoples with the result 
that in dealings between the government and aboriginals the honour of 
the Crown is at stake. Because of this fiduciary relationship, and its 
implications for the honour of the Crown, treatise, section 35(1) [the 
aboriginal rights section of the 1982 Constitution] . . . and other 
provisions . . . must be given a generous and liberal interpretation.43  
This is not strictly speaking new. It has long been held, throughout the 
Commonwealth, that “the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with 
aboriginal peoples.”44 However, in the past this had been narrowly construed as 
applying only to official “status” Indians living in reserves, who had a ward-like 
legal and political status. (The duty also applied only to the federal government, as 
will be discussed later.) But the recent cases declare the “honour of the Crown” 
and the fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duties associated with it apply to all aboriginal 
peoples, “status” or not, living on reserves or not, and also apply to situations 
involving land interests that are not (yet) subject to land claims litigation. Since 
most of the territory of resource-rich British Columbia either is or could be 
subject to aboriginal title claims, as are vast swaths of the Far North, the major 
expansion of the “duty to consult” has very important practical effects. 
The leading Supreme Court cases on this are Guerin45 and Haida Nation. In 
Guerin, the Musqueam nation had wanted (in the 1950s) to lease a good part of its 
valuable reserve, located within Greater Vancouver, to a golf course. Since interest 
 
40. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R 511 (Can). 
41. Id. at para 16 (emphasis added). 
42. See, e.g., Gwaii Haanas Agreement, PARKS CANADA (Jan. 30, 1993), http:// 
www.pc.gc.ca/eng/pn-np/bc/gwaiihaanas/plan/plan2.aspx, a fascinating political document between 
the Government of Canada and the Council of the Haida Nation establishing rules for the nature 
reserve that the Haida call Haida Gwaans and whites call South Moresby Island. The Agreement 
states that the Haida Nation claims sovereignty, not title, over the territory; that Parks Canada 
disagrees, since they consider the Crown has sovereignty; but that the two joint authorities agree on 
rules for the management of the space. 
43. R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 24 (Can.). 
44. R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 S.C.R 1075, para. 75 (Can.). 
45. Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.). 
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in Indian lands, most particularly reserves, cannot be alienated except to the 
Crown,46 the band had asked the Department of Indian Affairs to lease the land 
on its behalf, as is routinely done in such cases. The government ended up signing 
a lease whose terms were far less favourable to the Musqueam than those 
originally agreed, and compounded the breach of fiduciary duty by refusing—for 
fifteen years at a stretch—to show the actual lease to the band leaders. By the time 
the Musqueam saw the lease, the political climate had changed, and the high-
handed actions of 1950s Indian Affairs officials were not so likely to go 
unquestioned. Just as importantly, by the 1970s, the provision of the Indian Act 
that prohibited the collection of funds to sue the government regarding aboriginal 
land claims had been repealed.47 
The British Columbia court of appeal followed the old Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council jurisprudence and decided that “once the surrender documents 
were signed the Crown could lease to anyone on whatever terms it saw fit.”48 But 
the Supreme Court found that there was a fiduciary obligation and that this had 
been breached. The court’s text constructs the (federal) Crown as the benevolent 
patriarch that assumed the role of protecting Indians against greedy settlers and 
racist provincial governments previously performed, in theory, by the British 
Crown. Just what kind of fiduciary obligation the federal government has, 
however, was left unspecified. The fiduciary obligation is not a trust, Chief Justice 
Dickson warned: it is “sui generis.”49 In another case, the Supreme Court 
continued to fudge the issue of just what kind of fiduciary duty is involved by 
stating that while the Crown is not really a trustee, it has “trustee-like” obligations. 
In that later case the court relied mainly on a statute regarding oil and gas royalties 
to come to its conclusion, in a text in which one can almost hear the judges’ 
audible sigh of relief at being able to simply interpret an ordinary statute, rather 
than be forced to create new law by defining the “sui generis” fiduciary obligation 
to aboriginal peoples.50 
In the Guerin decision, the fact that the Indian Affairs officials were 
themselves “the Crown,” for purposes of receiving the interest in land that the 
Musqueam had to surrender in order for it to be leased, is, not surprisingly, not 
 
46. This is true generally within the common law, but it was also a key clause in the 1763 
Royal Proclamation. See KING GEORGE, A PROCLAMATION (Oct. 7, 1763), reprinted in A 
COLLECTION OF THE ACTS PASSED IN THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AND OF OTHER 
PUBLIC ACTS RELATIVE TO CANADA 26, 32, 34 (1824). The Royal Proclamation, however, is not 
usually taken as applying to nonreserve Indians in Western Canada, who make up the vast majority of 
Canadian aboriginal peoples, or to any of the aboriginal peoples of the far North (e.g. Nunavut). 
47. See Hamar Foster, Letting Go of the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British Columbia, 1849–
1927, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAW 28 (Hamar Foster & J. McLaren, eds., 1995). 
48. Guerin, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. 
49. See John Borrows & Leonard Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It 
Make a Difference?, 36 ALBERTA L. REV. 9, 10–13 (1997) (describing an obligation as “sui generis” can 
work to limit it). 
50. Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (Can.). 
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mentioned. A handy distinction is drawn between the (unfaithful) servants of the 
crown and the crown itself, with “the honour of the Crown” being attributed 
wholly to the latter. Servants of the Crown might be dishonourable, but “it is 
always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises.”51 Just where the 
servants of the Crown end and the Crown or sovereign itself begins is a question 
left unasked, however, much less answered. But the fact that the lines between the 
Crown itself and its servants are extremely fluid (unlike in most private law 
situations) is not an invention of Canadian judges. As Ernst Kantorowicz pointed 
out long ago, English theories of the Crown’s supernatural qualities have since the 
Middle Ages enabled interested parties to create a separation between the (always 
honourable) Crown and not only its lower servants, such as Indian Affairs 
department bureaucrats, but even the monarch. Since Edward II and Richard II 
were forced out of power, even the monarch can, in English discourses of the 
Crown, be regarded as a threat to the Crown.52  
A later decision, one that uncharacteristically admits that in the end it is the 
Crown, in one personification, that acts dishonourably, without this being any 
threat to the belief in eternal, essential honour, shows the applicability of 
Kantorowicz’s famous analysis of English medieval theories of sovereignty to 
today’s Canada: “Once a reserve is created the Crown’s fiduciary duty expands. . . . 
The Crown must use diligence to protect a band’s legal interest from exploitative 
bargaining by third parties or from exploitation by the Crown itself.”53 
This admission that the name of the game is using one instantiation of the 
Crown against another is a one-off slip, however. The most important “duty to 
consult” decision, a 2004 case involving the highly politicized Haida Nation (a 
northern British Columbia people who have never signed treaties or lived in 
reserves), does not mention the possibility that the Crown might itself constitute a 
threat to the very people who are under its protection. In that case and most 
others out of British Columbia, the Queen in Right of British Columbia was, 
arguably, guilty of the very injustices that were supposed to be remedied by 
invoking the honour of the non-British Columbia crown. Instead, in Haida Nation 
the Supreme Court writes as if “the Crown” were a singular entity, rather than the 
complex bundle of “personae” in perpetual motion that it is, especially in a state 
whose monarch is actually in another country:54 
 
51. Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, para. 20 (Can.). 
52. See KANTOROWICZ, supra note 7, at 23 (in France, executing the king brought about a 
republic: in England, by contrast, the king’s “body natural” can be removed from power or even 
executed while the king’s body politic and the closely related “Crown” can remain, and indeed act as 
that for the sake of which the king has to be removed). See also id. at 341–57 (analyzing coronation 
oaths in which the king promises not to alienate Crown estates). 
53. Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245 (Can.). 
54. “It is insufficient to state, as the Supreme Court of Canada did in Bear Island, that the 
Crown ‘breached its fiduciary duty to the Indians’ without revealing which personification of the 
Crown are bound by those obligations. In a juridical context, the phrase ‘the Crown’ has a multitude 
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The government’s duty to consult with aboriginal peoples and 
accommodate their interests is grounded in the honour of the Crown.55  
. . . . 
It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises.56 
. . . . 
The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined, 
recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting 
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process 
continues, the honour of the Crown may require to consult . . . 
Aboriginal interests.57  
. . . . 
The Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over 
Aboriginal interests . . . .58  
 And depriving aboriginal people of the resource (timber, in this case) is 
not permissible because “that is not honourable.”59  
The hypnotic repetition of what Kantorowicz’s analysis suggests is a crypto-
Christian term, namely “the honour of the Crown”—whose epistemology relies 
on the Christian notion that Christ had a natural body that died on the cross but 
has a mystical body that lives forever in the corporation-like communion of saints, 
just as the Crown lives on whatever happens to Queen Elizabeth or Prince 
Charles—has the effect of taking attention away from the curious absence of any 
reference to authoritative common law sources. Significantly, there is no footnote 
after the term “the historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown”;60 
here and elsewhere, the Court only cites its own recent cases.61  
The internal logic of the doctrines and texts within which “the honour of the 
Crown” appears is unpacked in unusual detail in an interesting text authored by 
the Treaty Commissioner for the government of Saskatchewan, David M. Arnot. 
In a lecture entitled “The Honour of the Crown,” Mr. Arnot suggests that rather 
than be embarrassed by the antique notion of the Crown’s honour, we 
(Canadians) should embrace our mystical legal tradition without embarrassment, 
 
of meanings which refer to a variety of personae.” ROTMAN, supra note 4, at 16. 
55. Haida Nation, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, para. 16. 
56. Id. at para. 20. 
57. Id. at para. 25. 
58. Id. at para. 27. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at para. 17. 
61. Even the official government summary of current law on the Crown’s fiduciary duties that 
is available on the Parliamentary Library website, alongside other summaries characterized by their 
uncritical stance, complains that “the standards for government conduct that will uphold ‘the honour 
of the Crown’ in various situations require clarification.” The Crown’s Fiduciary Relationship with 
Aboriginal Peoples, PRB 00-09E, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-
R/LoPBdP/BP/prb0009-e.htm (last visited May 22, 2011). 
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since “the honour of the Crown” “reflects the deepest and oldest layer of our 
traditions of human rights in Canada.”62 Judges have tended to treat the doctrine 
as a mere “principle of statutory construction”63 or as a principle to interpret 
treaties, but the phrase, Arnot believes, is more than that. It is actually “the 
conscience of the country.”64  
Is it any wonder that American colonists, during the 18th century 
agitations that preceded their revolution . . . appealed to “the honour of 
the Crown” to protect them from men they described as “the King’s evil 
ministers”? In doing this, they distinguished between the Crown per se, 
which traditionally stood for what is just and honourable, and the 
government of the day, which was susceptible to corruption and 
misconduct. Appealing to the honour of the Crown was an appeal not 
merely to the sovereign as a person, but to a traditional bedrock of 
principles of fundamental justice that lay beyond persons and beyond 
politics. It is precisely this distinction between principles and persons that 
rests at the heart of our ideals of human rights today.65 
One of the most curious things about this text—and there are many—is that 
Arnot seems to have forgotten that the American colonists actually rejected the 
Crown itself, and not just the King’s misguided ministers.  
But Arnot is not alone in his refusal to contemplate even for a minute the 
possibility of a postmonarchical regime for Canada. In a recent article, noted 
aboriginal legal scholar Sakej Henderson also provides a rather positive, almost 
rosy view of the Crown in his discussion of the government’s newly expanded 
“duty to consult.”66 Along similar lines, John Borrows’s magisterial work, Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution, does not use terms such as “the Canadian state” or “the 
federal government” except on rare occasions. While stating in the introductory 
chapter that the most crucial brainwashing he underwent in law school consisted 
of acquiring “the belief that the Crown is all-powerful,”67 when later in the book 
he speculates about how Canadian law might integrate aboriginal legal traditions, 
he adds that aboriginal nations might also decide to give “the Crown” and “Crown 
law” some role in their own territories.68  
Perhaps one of the reasons why leading aboriginal legal scholars are much 
more positive about the “honour of the Crown” than one would expect is that, 
historically, the Crown signed treaties with aboriginal nations, at least in parts of 
Canada, whereas most federal and provincial governments gave very little if any 
 
62. David M. Arnot, The Honour of the Crown, 60 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 339, 339 (1996). 
63. See id. at 342. 
64. See id. at 345. 
65. Id. at 340. 
66. James [Sake’j] Youngblood Henderson, Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism for Constitutional 
Governance, 72 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 29, 29 (2009). 
67. BORROWS, supra note 3, at 28. 
68. Id. at 182. 
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political recognition to aboriginal nations. In addition, for aboriginal nations the 
supremacy of Parliament is not a particularly useful doctrine; and other democratic 
mechanisms that empower majorities and disempower minorities also have the 
potential to perpetuate grave injustices.69 
At the more practical level, declaring that the “honour of the Crown” (not 
treaties or rights documents) is the foundation of the “duty to consult” means that 
aboriginal peoples do not have to engage in the always somewhat demeaning work 
of proving a legal right by establishing title or rights according to the rules of 
white courts. Indeed, in regard to the “duty to consult,” proving or even 
formulating title claims, through oral narratives or other evidence, is somewhat 
beside the point. It is highly significant that courts have held that the “duty to 
consult” applies even in the case of peoples (such as the Haida) who have not 
even initiated litigation for aboriginal title.  Despite the symbolically important 
declarations that evidence in aboriginal knowledge formats is admissible and has 
weight, actually deploying the evidence and making it count in court has proven to 
be legally difficult, as well as extremely expensive and sometimes downright 
humiliating, as documented above. The clearly paternalist epistemological and 
political effects of the “honour of the Crown” doctrine may be the lesser of two 
evils, given this reality. 
A related point with great practical significance is that the only crown that 
was thought to have fiduciary responsibilities, for many years, was the federal 
crown (and then only in respect to treaty Indians). In Haida, by contrast, the 
Supreme Court found that the provincial crown also has a “duty to consult” and if 
possible accommodate aboriginal interests. Given the importance of timber, water, 
minerals, and other natural resources formally designated as under provincial 
jurisdiction in the Canadian economy, particularly in the North and the West, 
including provincial governments under the “duty to consult” may have huge 
implications. 
The result of these cases is quite paradoxical. As courts proceed to partially 
disavow some of the more racist moments in Canadian law and politics, it may be 
that radically changing what counts as evidence of legal possession by admitting 
and giving weight to knowledges of history in aboriginal formats may matter less 
than peering into medieval mists to redescribe the Crown in terms that make the 
feudal history of “the Crown” converge with Canadian multiculturalism and 
diversity politics.  
IV. CONCLUSION: MULTICULTURALISM, RECONCILIATION, AND THE 
REFURBISHED CROWN 
As in Australia, the ambiguous notion of “reconciliation” can be discerned 
hovering over all of the litigation and all the political negotiations discussed thus 
 
69. I would like to thank Amar Bhatia for useful comments and sources on this point. 
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far. In Canada, reconciliation is often said to be rooted in, or even required by, the 
aboriginal rights section of the 1982 Constitution, 35 (1): “The existing aboriginal 
and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed.” In interpreting and applying this constitutional provision courts have 
decided that the purpose of the section is to effect the “reconciliation of the prior 
occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal societies with the assertion 
of Crown sovereignty.”70  
The assertion of the very question that one would think is at stake is not 
unique to judges. For example, the Manitoba department of Aboriginal and 
Northern Affairs’s document on “Crown consultations with aboriginal peoples” 
states as a noncontroversial matter that “One of the main goals of the Crown-
aboriginal relationship is to further the reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.”71 
There is a vast literature on section 35(1), which we cannot here even begin 
to canvass. For our purposes, it suffices to point out that even though some 
negotiations that have taken place or are in progress may well end up granting 
certain rights to aboriginal Nations, the “reconciliation” process which such 
contemporary treaties and agreements seek to implement explicitly leaves 
untouched not only the fact of Canadian government sovereignty but also the 
underlying question of the justice and legitimacy of the Crown’s sovereignty.  
The underlying normative question, of course, is whether any instantiation of 
the crown—the French crown in New France, the British Crown in colonial 
Canada, the post-1867 government of Canada, etc.—had any right whatsoever to 
simply declare itself the sovereign of territories that have been acknowledged even 
by the most racist courts to have been occupied for many centuries by a variety of 
aboriginal peoples, peoples who (unlike in other parts of the former British 
Empire) have never been held to have been defeated in war.  
Some might say that questioning the ultimate normative ground of the 
sovereignty of “the Crown” is simply unthinkable, at least to judges.72 However, 
the sovereignty of the Canadian federal state is not quite as unshakeable as the 
discourse about the Crown’s honour might suggest. First of all, the original 
pleadings in Delgamuukw were for “ownership and jurisdiction.” Although at the 
Supreme Court stage the pleadings had been changed to the more practical and 
achievable claim of aboriginal title, the term “jurisdiction” is there for all to see, in 
 
70. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, paras. 81, 141 (Can.); see also R 
v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 31 (Can.). 
71. Crown Consultations with Aboriginal Peoples, PROVINCE OF MANITOBA, www.gov.mb.ca/ana 
/crown_consultations (last visited May 13, 2011). 
72. Brian Slattery points out that a careful reading of some of Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
decisions suggests that sovereignty, at least white Canadian sovereignty in British Columbia, is being 
subtly redefined as “de facto.” See Slattery, supra note 4, at 445. But that is perhaps an overly 
optimistic/progressive reading. As Borrows and others show, the “alchemy of sovereignty” continues 
to be performed in courtrooms across the country with little if any serious disruption. 
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the Delgamuukw’s decision recounting of the lower-court proceedings. But perhaps 
most significantly: as the Supreme Court was deciding Delgamuukw, the 
government of Quebec and the government of Canada were sharpening their 
respective legal knives in preparation for the all-out fight over sovereignty that was 
the “Quebec Secession Reference,” decided in 1998.73 Nevertheless, the continuing 
visibility of the Quebec sovereigntist movement does not seem to have had much 
effect on either Quebecois or Anglo-Canadian perceptions of what is “at stake” in 
the struggle over aboriginal rights. 
In Canadian popular discourse as well as within law, aboriginal rights 
litigation is not regarded as significantly affecting other dimensions of state policy 
(e.g., multiculturalism, or the Quebec question). And one reason for this 
fragmented view of state action (even just federal state action) is that “the Crown” 
is the key interlocutor only for purposes of aboriginal rights litigation and 
discussions. Ethnic Canadians organizing to have diversity affirmed and valued 
rarely, if ever, think or speak about the Crown.74 They think about and try to 
intervene in state policy, not Crown deeds. 
But in the context of aboriginal politics and aboriginal collective rights, the 
Crown seems to have become more meaningful and powerful in recent years, 
rather than less. This is a historically peculiar event that the great authorities on 
the English constitution could not have predicted. After all, as is well known, after 
canvassing some of the unwritten doctrines about the Crown in English law, 
Frederick Maitland ended the matter by stating, “As a matter of fact we know that 
the crown does nothing but lie in the Tower of London to be gazed at by sight-
seers.”75  
But as Maitland documented, and as one sees in recent aboriginal rights 
litigation, one of the curious things about the Crown is that it has the divine 
power of being in many places at once. So it can be in the Tower of London, in 
the hand of Queen Elizabeth as she signs laws, in the mind of the Canadian 
Governor-General as she opens, or prorogues, Parliament—and at the same time, 
in “The Queen in Right of Canada,” “The Queen in Right of British Columbia,” 
and so on. Kantorowicz famously documented the workings of the political 
fiction about the “king’s two bodies”; but even someone with the erudition of a 
Kantorowicz, or a Maitland, would be hard pressed to carry out a full inventory of 
the numerous instantiations of the mystical entity that is “the Crown.” But one 
thing we can say is that one of its most effective incarnations is that which can be 
 
73. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
74. As an ethnic Canadian myself, the only time I had to think about “the Crown” prior to 
researching this paper was when I took my oath of Canadian citizenship. That the oath was not to the 
flag or the constitution of Canada but rather to “the Queen, her heirs and successors” came as quite a 
surprise. And only when reading Kantorowicz did I learn the interesting fact that “successors,” in this 
context, refers to the corporation sole that is the Crown, which never dies, whereas “heirs” are the 
descendants who succeed the current monarch after her natural body dies. 
75. F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 418 (1961). 
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discerned somewhere in the robing rooms of the Supreme Court of Canada—
where the crown is being quietly refurbished so that it goes better with the new 
multicultural decor of the nation-state but in such a way as legitimates the 
(English) monarchy. 
 
 
 
 
 
